The Skinny competition

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Paper, Specifications, Results and Updates available at :
https://sites.google.com/site/skinnycipher/

Any new cryptanalysis of SKINNY is welcome!

SKINNY goals and results

Goals

- Provide an alternative to NSA-designed SIMON block cipher
- Construct a lightweight (tweakable) block cipher
- Achieve scalable security
- Suitable for most lightweight applications
- Perform and share full security analysis
- Efficient software/hardware implementations in many scenarios

Results

- ▷ SKINNY family of (tweakable) block ciphers
- ▷ 64 or 128-bit block, various tweakey sizes : n, 2n and 3n bits
- Security guarantees for differential/linear cryptanalysis (both single and related-key)
- ▷ Efficient and competitive software/hardware implementations
 - Round-based SKINNY-64-128: 1539 GE (SIMON: 1751 GE)
 - on Skylake (avx2): 2.78 c/B (SIMON: 1.81 c/B) for fixed-key

	Tweakey size t		
Block size <i>n</i>	n	2n	3n
64	32 rounds	36 rounds	40 rounds
128	40 rounds	48 rounds	56 rounds

SKINNY has several versions :

- SKINNY-64-128 has 36 rounds
- SKINNY-128-128 has 40 rounds

To motivate further cryptanalysis on SKINNY, we proposed several (very) reduced versions for a cryptanalysis competition

The SKINNY competition categories

We proposed **5 categories**, best cryptanalysis for :

- 1 26 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 30 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 2 24 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 28 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 3 22 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 26 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 4 20 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 24 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 5 18 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 22 rounds of SKINNY-128-128



We proposed **5** categories, best cryptanalysis for :

 Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack on Reduced-Round SKINNY by R. Ankele, S. Banik, A. Chakraborti, E. List, F. Mendel, S.M. Sim and G. Wang



SKINNY-64-128 SKINNY-128-128

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SKINNY-64-128 SKINNY-128-128

1+2= 3 gifts Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack on Reduced-Round SKINNY by R. Ankele, S. Banik, A. Chakraborti, E. List, F. Mendel, S.M. Sim and G. Wang

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Comparing Simon, Skinny and others

Ratio of rounds required for Diff/Lin resistance

Cipher	Single Key (SK)	Related Key (RK)
SKINNY-64-128	8/36 = 22%	15/36 = 42%
SIMON-64-128	19/44 = 43%	no bound known
SKINNY-128-128	15/40 = <mark>37%</mark>	19/40 = 47%
SIMON-128-128	37/68 = 54%	no bound known
AES-128	4/10 = 40%	6/10 = 60%

Ratio of attacked rounds

Cipher	Single Key (SK)	Related Key (RK)
SKINNY-64-128	20/36 = 55%	24/36 = 66%
SIMON-64-128	31/44 = 70%	? > 70%
SKINNY-128-128	18/40 = 45%	21/40 = 52%
SIMON-128-128	49/68 = 72%	$? \geq 72\%$
AES-128	7/10 = 70%	7/10 = 70%

Ratio of attacked rounds (single-key)



Comparing Simon and Skinny (related-key)

Ratio of attacked rounds (related-key)



The Skinny 17/18 competition

The SKINNY competition 17/18 categories

We propose **5 categories**, best cryptanalysis for :

- 1 32 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 30 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 2 30 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 28 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 3 28 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 26 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 4 26 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 24 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
- 5 24 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or 22 rounds of SKINNY-128-128



The SKINNY competition 17/18 categories

We propose **5 categories**, best cryptanalysis for :

- 2 30 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or
 28 rounds of SKINNY-128-128 gets 4 presents from 4 different countries (chosen by the winner)
- 3 28 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or
 26 rounds of SKINNY-128-128 gets 3 presents from 3 different countries (chosen by the winner)
- 26 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or
 24 rounds of SKINNY-128-128 gets 2 presents from 2 different countries (chosen by the winner)

5 24 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 or
 22 rounds of SKINNY-128-128
 gets 1 present (country chosen by the winner)

The SKINNY competition 17/18 rules

the SKINNY designers will judge the best attack submitted after the deadline, but main criterion will be : final complexity (computations, data and memory), application to other SKINNY versions, novelty, attack model, etc.

b types of attacks :

- single-key and related-key attacks qualify for the competition
- we will decide separately if accelerated brute force (e.g. biclique attacks) qualifies for the competition
- related-cipher attacks do not qualify for the competition
- tweak is allowed for of up to 64 bits for SKINNY-64-128
 (but in that case, security bound is 2^k where k is the key size)
- attacks from the SKINNY document count as already existing attacks
- ▷ if some attacks are similar, the first submitted has priority
- ▷ winners to be announced / gifts to be given during FSE'18



When :

- ▶ start : now !
- end : deadline for submission 1st of February 2018

Attacks are to be submitted to skinny@googlegroups.com (state in the submission from which countries you want the gift)

